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Abstract—Hands-on training is an effective way to practice theoretical cybersecurity concepts and increase participants’ skills. In this
paper, we discuss the application of visual analytics principles to the design, execution, and evaluation of training sessions. We
propose a conceptual model employing visual analytics that supports the sensemaking activities of users involved in various phases of
the training life cycle. The model emerged from our long-term experience in designing and organizing diverse hands-on cybersecurity
training sessions. It provides a classification of visualizations and can be used as a framework for developing novel visualization tools
supporting phases of the training life-cycle. We demonstrate the model application on examples covering two types of cybersecurity
training programs.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Our society is being exposed to an increasing number of
cyber threats and attacks. The lack of a strong cybersecurity
workforce presents a critical danger for companies and
nations [1]. Hands-on training of new professionals is an
effective way to remedy this situation. In our work, we
use visual-based sense-making and reasoning to support
participants in better and faster comprehension of attacks,
threats, and defense strategies.
The ability to use visual-based analytical reasoning is
essential in many fields, including biology [2], medicine [3],
urbanization [4], and education [5]. The goal of this paper is
to create a conceptual framework providing broader insight
into the application of visual analytics (VA) principles [6] in
hands-on cybersecurity training. Conceptual models like the
one proposed in this paper help researchers design effective
visual techniques in a given domain. To the best of our
knowledge, the current literature for cybersecurity training
lacks such a conceptual model.
There are several reasons for the absence of a conceptual
model. Existing hands-on cybersecurity training is largely
heterogeneous. Training sessions differ in content, organi-
zation, target audience, and technical means. Moreover, the
cybersecurity domain represents a sensitive area similar to
military or intelligence services, in which many sources are
secret or restricted. Therefore, it is challenging to become fa-
miliar with this domain and clarify the terms and processes.
Fortunately, we have the benefit of seven years of experi-
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ence with the design and organization of training sessions.
The results of this paper arise from close cooperation with
domain experts who directly participate in the development
and operation of the KYPO Cyber Range [7] – a sophisticated
platform for cybersecurity training. Their knowledge and
the survey of other existing approaches are essential for this
work.
The two most widely recognized hands-on cybersecurity
training activities are Capture the Flag (CTF) and the Cyber
Defense Exercise (CDX). The main difference lies in their
educational goals. While CTFs focus mainly on improving
hard skills in the cybersecurity domain, CDXs target both
hard and soft skills. CTF features a game-like approach [8]–
[11]. Participants gain points for solving technical tasks
that exercise their cybersecurity skills. Completing each
task yields a text string called flag. In contrast, CDXs have
been traditionally organized by military and governmental
agencies [12] that emphasize realistic training scenarios
that authentically mimic the operational environment of
a real organization [13]. We deeply analyzed these types
of training programs to distill a unified visual analytics
model that fits the heterogeneous cyber-training events and
is simultaneously instructive for the design of specialized
visual analytics tools.
The major contributions of this paper are: (a) a definition
of a unified training life cycle with user roles having clear
responsibilities and requirements; (b) a proposal for a con-
ceptual model of visual analytics for hands-on cybersecurity
training that can be used as a framework for further research
and for developing visualizations supporting particular life-
cycle tasks; and (c) demonstrations of the applicability of the
model using real examples and lessons learned from our
long-term experience in designing and organizing hands-on
cybersecurity training.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
the related work. In Section 3, we discuss the generic
life cycle of hands-on cybersecurity training sessions with
user roles that delimit requirements put on analytical tasks
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2and visualizations. Sections 4 and 5 provide classification
schemes for data and analytical visualizations. A demon-
stration of the conceptual model is presented in Section 6.
Section 7 summarizes the observations attained during our
research. Section 8 outlines the direction for future research
topics.
2 RELATED WORK
Our work is unique in its close interconnection of three
areas: visual analytics, cybersecurity, and education. Pub-
lications dealing directly with the intersection of these fields
are rare. Therefore, we have explored related work from
several relevant points of view.
2.1 Visual Analytics in Cybersecurity
Many works have addressed the challenges related to
the design or evaluation of cybersecurity tools and tech-
niques [14]–[18]. A visual analytics approach to automated
planning attacks has been discussed [19]. All the sur-
veys have confirmed the importance of supporting analytic
tasks by visual interfaces. However, they are aimed at the
security-related focus only and do not tackle the educational
aspect of the training of new experts. We took the challenges
into account in our work, and we incorporated specific
aspects of hands-on cybersecurity exercises.
2.2 Visual Analytics in Education and Training
Another perspective that considers visualizations in relation
to cybersecurity emphasizes the educational aspect. There
are distinct approaches to enhancing cybersecurity abilities
that focus on training or teaching computer security [20]–
[22]. However, these works again provide outputs of a nar-
row scope and often omit any profound conceptualization
of their findings.
To help us comprehend the topic more thoroughly, we
do not focus exclusively on the cybersecurity field; we also
consider studies that relate to education and training from a
broader view. A recent survey [23] introduces a literature
classification in the field of interactive visualization for
education with a focus on evaluation, and it lists common
categories of educational visualizations from distinct fields.
In this respect, our work is unique as it considers more than
the educational theory. It also includes the application of
hands-on training with practical and technical aspects that
are an essential part of the learning process.
The issue of education has been approached from the
opposite direction [24]. In this work, the authors focus on
predictive models for teachers of higher education institu-
tions. They confirm the need for insight for both the teachers
and the students that exceed simple summative feedback.
2.3 Generic Models of Visual Analytics
Many generic design frameworks, models, and methods
exist in the literature. These provide a structure and expla-
nation of activities that designers perform when proposing
suitable visualization tools [25]–[28]. However, the aim of
this paper is not to discuss processes leading to the devel-
opment of specific visualizations for cybersecurity training.
Instead, we provide a conceptualization of the domain so
that our model can serve as a framework for discussion
and the efficient application of existing design methods for
specific training tasks.
Fig. 1. Altered version of models by Keim [29] and Sacha [30] for insight
retrieval based on visual analytics approaches.
Our solution builds upon Keim’s [29] and Sacha’s [30]
conceptual models for the visual analytics process. The
VA process is characterized by the interaction between
data, visualizations, models of the data, and users discov-
ering knowledge, as shown in Fig. 1. Keim emphasizes
the computer-driven components of the VA process; Sacha
extends the model with human reasoning. Data carries facts
in structured, semi-structured, or unstructured form. The
model captures the results of automated analysis methods.
The interactive visualizations are the primary user interface
presenting data and models in a comprehensible manner. The
human-centered part consists of three loops. The exploration
loop captures low-level visual interactions using actions and
findings that are specific for individual visualizations and
interests. The analysts then refine their hypotheses in the
verification loop. The knowledge generation loop describes the
transition from observations into generalized knowledge.
These two models form the foundations of our work. We
utilize data and visualization components of Keim’s model
and narrow our focus on the verification loop that plays
a crucial role in building knowledge in any domain. The
model component of the VA process represents the cross-
cutting concern, which is out of the scope of this paper.
Therefore, we do not provide a separate classification for it.
Instead, we mention suitable models in our discussion of the
classification of visualizations and hypotheses. The exploration
loop and knowledge generation loop are omitted since they
provide either too detailed or too generic concepts.
3 CYBERSECURITY TRAINING LIFE CYCLE
The human loops of Sacha’s VA model (see Fig. 1) reflect
the needs of users who interact with the computer system.
Based on the literature review, our experience, and the
application of analytical methods, we distilled the following
general life cycle that clarifies who is involved in the human
loops, what they expect (at a high level of abstraction), and
when they conduct their VA tasks. These pieces of informa-
tion are later used for the detailed conceptualization of the
“computer part” of the VA model by answering what (data
and hypotheses) and how (visualizations) can be analyzed
in the cyber training.
33.1 Phases
Based on the literature review and our experience, we
distilled three generic phases (see Fig. 2) of the cybersecurity
training life cycle. We performed a theory-driven qualita-
tive coding method [31] on four key papers [32]–[35] that
deal with organizational aspects of cybersecurity training.
Using an open coding method helped us to structure the
analysis and consolidate observations. Phases and outcomes
discussed in the analyzed papers can slightly differ from
our model. Nevertheless, the subtleties are rather negligible
since the terminology in this domain is yet not established.
Fig. 2. Cybersecurity training life-cycle phases with corresponding user
roles, and main outcomes of each phase.
Planning is the first phase of any new training. The goal
is to formulate technical and educational requirements, set
measurable objectives, and allocate necessary resources. The
training definition – the main output – is a set of (more or less)
formally defined configurations of the computer network
and its nodes, specification of attacks, training tasks and
objectives, scoring rules, expected skills of participants, and
related configuration data of the training.
The execution phase represents a training session in
which participants are physically involved. User activities
and the state of the training infrastructure are monitored,
and the data is stored for further analysis. We refer to the
data from this phase as training runs.
During the reflection phase, training definitions and train-
ing runs are analyzed and evaluated. Reflection can be
conducted at any time. Analysts usually explore the data
after each training run to learn from it or provide feedback
to involved people. However, they can also analyze the data
before or during the planning phase of a new training ses-
sion to gradually improve its quality. The reflection phase,
therefore, helps to increase the proficiency in designing and
organizing training events.
3.2 User Roles
The requirements put on visual analytic interfaces are af-
fected by user roles. The basic roles emerged from the life
cycle. They reflect individual phases captured in Fig. 2. For
clarity, our roles are CAPITALIZED in the paper.
TRAINING DESIGNERS (DESIGNERS for short) are re-
sponsible for the design of training definitions during the
planning phase. Multiple designers with different skills are
usually involved in the preparation of new training content.
Cybersecurity experts contribute primarily to the technical
aspects; education experts are responsible for defining the
learning objectives and assessment criteria.
PARTICIPANTS represent everyone involved in the train-
ing event. Their analytical activities are associated with
situational awareness and gaining insight into the training
during the execution phase.
The TRAINING ANALYST (ANALYST for short) role cov-
ers all the people who conduct the post-training analysis of
collected data. In our VA model, this role is used to capture
the requirements of generic analytical interactions. Various
people interested in the relevant data can take on this role,
e.g., cybersecurity experts looking for talented participants.
Fig. 3. Hierarchy of user roles participating in cybersecurity training.
These three roles are not independent. Arrows in Fig. 3
represent the inheritance of user roles as defined by require-
ments analysis methodologies in software engineering [36].
It means that DESIGNERS and PARTICIPANTS can conduct
post-training analysis like other TRAINING ANALYSTS, e.g.,
to get feedback on completed training sessions. On the other
hand, they can have a specific responsibility during the
planning or execution phases, respectively.
The high-level roles that emerged from the life cycle
proved to be too general to capture the fine-grained require-
ments of heterogeneous groups of people participating in
real training events. Therefore, we employed the personas
design method [37] to reveal archetypal users and further
decompose user roles. We analyzed the same sources that
we used during the conceptualization of the life cycle [32]–
[35]. The observed personas are summarized in Table 1.
CTF training includes only two types of personas, which
correspond to a teacher-student relation. The student (or
learner) follows instructions defined by the training definition
and performs the required tasks. The instructor facilitates
the training session from the educational point of view.
Moreover, the instructor is also responsible for the technical
aspects of training and addresses any possible technical
difficulties with the underlying infrastructure.
In CDXs, we identified seven personas. Blue team mem-
bers are similar to learners of CTFs. They have to defend
the entrusted network from the attacks of the red team.
White team members are responsible for the organization
and compliance with the “game rules” of a CDX. Fictitious
users represent common users of the defended network. Law
enforcement officers check whether the actions of the blue team
are legal. Journalists request reports from the blue teams.
4Finally, the green team is responsible for maintaining the
infrastructure of the exercise.
By deeply analyzing the responsibilities and analytical
goals of identified personas, we generalized them to four
user roles. The mapping is captured in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Mapping of CTF/CDX personas to fine-grained user roles.
user roles CTF personas CDX personas
trainee student (learner) blue team
sparring partner – red team
white team
fictitious user
law enforcement officer
journalist
supervisor instructor green team
white team
operator instructor green team
TRAINEES solve tasks described in the training definition.
Their activities are monitored and assessed. They can work
either individually or in teams. For the sake of simplicity,
we use the term “trainee” for both cases.
SPARRING PARTNERS represent individuals or teams
involved in training sessions who actively compete with
TRAINEES but who are not directly assessed. Sparring part-
ners also follow the instructions from the training definition.
However, their requirements for data analysis, feedback,
and other educational aspects differ from the requirements
for TRAINEES.
SUPERVISORS, unlike SPARRING PARTNERS, do not fol-
low the exact rules of the training definition. They are respon-
sible for overseeing the training session, enforcing rules, and
other activities that are not exactly defined.
OPERATORS are responsible for the underlying (tech-
nical) infrastructure of the hands-on training. This role
requires technical skills and a good knowledge of the under-
lying technologies. The work of operators can significantly
affect the course of the exercise since any technical difficul-
ties can devalue educational results regardless of how well
the training session has been prepared.
All the roles distilled from personas represent partici-
pants directly involved in a specific training session. There-
fore, they are defined as descendants of the PARTICIPANT
role in the schema in Fig. 3. While TRAINEES are the primary
subject of training sessions, SPARRING PARTNERS, together
with SUPERVISORS and OPERATORS, represent backstage
organizing participants.
4 DATA
Visualizations designed for operational cybersecurity deal
with large data sets [15]. In contrast, training events are
limited in time, resources, and the number of participants.
As a result, the amount of data produced during the train-
ing sessions is also usually limited. However, the data is
highly heterogeneous. Therefore, our classification has been
developed iteratively together with the analysis of other
parts of the VA model. The proposed scheme comes from
the unified life cycle. Data categories reflect user roles and
training phases during which the data is created. It enables
us to clarify what data is available in each phase and define
limitations to be considered in analytical visualizations.
Technical scenarios (D1) capture the technical aspects
and predefined processes of a training definition. The tech-
nical aspects include, for example, the definition of the
network topology, software running on individual network
nodes (operating system, applications, services), and vul-
nerabilities injected in the network nodes. User procedures
are defined as attack plans (attack vectors and their timing),
TRAINEES’ tasks, hints, and other formalized steps.
Assessment criteria (D2) determine how to assess
TRAINEES and how to measure whether learning objectives
were achieved. Assessment criteria define metrics, indica-
tors, and aspects of the training related to the evaluation
of TRAINEES. Apart from that, the criteria can also include
the definition of questionnaires for prerequisite testing of
TRAINEES, assessment questions during the exercise, and
post-training feedback surveys.
User actions (D3) are PARTICIPANTS’ actions monitored
and collected during the execution phase. Examples in-
clude commands entered by TRAINEES, displayed hints,
performed attacks or defenses and their results, intervention
of SUPERVISORS, and other user-oriented events.
Infrastructure data (D4) represent the state of computer
networks and the underlying technical infrastructure. The
data encodes node availability, available services, packet
flows, and the health of the infrastructure. The obtained
information can be used for direct infrastructure surveil-
lance, and the assessment of TRAINEES (e.g., TRAINEES can
be penalized for the unavailability of required services).
Assessment data (D5) are related to the assessment cri-
teria and determine the success rate of TRAINEES and their
results in achieving learning objectives. The data encodes
how successfully a particular user has solved a particular
task (in percentages or as obtained penalties), time spent
on tasks, answers to questionnaires, and other qualitative
and quantitative indicators of the learning process. A great
deal of quantitative data can be computed automatically by
applying assessment criteria (D2) to monitored user actions
and infrastructure data (D3 and D4).
TABLE 2
Data types mapping on life cycle phases, abstract data levels, and
terminology from the paper.
D1 & D2 D3 & D4 & D5
phase of creation planning execution
level of abstraction configuration data operational data
terminology training definition training run
Mapping data categories to the planning and execution
phases follows data abstraction as defined by Fowler for
software systems [38]: D1 and D2 represent data from the
configuration level. They are defined during the planning
phase by DESIGNERS as a part of training definitions. D3–D5
represent data from the operational level. They are acquired
during the execution phase and we refer to them as training
runs, as summarized in Table 2.
5 VISUALIZATIONS AND HYPOTHESES
According to the VA model of Sacha & Keim (see Fig. 1), re-
quirements applied to visualizations are driven by hypothe-
ses that people consider during their analytical activities.
5Fig. 4. Classification of visualizations and hypotheses in the context of hands-on cybersecurity training.
Therefore, we discuss and classify both visualizations and
hypotheses together.
The classification shown in Fig. 4 was established it-
eratively by balancing two complementary directions. We
broke down the top-level phases and roles of the training
life cycle and, concurrently, we searched for low-level hy-
potheses that we organized into clusters. Balancing these
two approaches, we concluded with a three-level classi-
fication scheme that, to the best of our knowledge, suf-
ficiently covers the problem domain and emphasizes the
design requirements of visual analytic tools. The low-level
hypotheses were obtained from discussions with six domain
experts (three of them are co-authors of this paper), each
with more than six years of experience with organizing CTFs
and CDXs. The final classification hierarchy was reached
by consensus of the authors whose expertise includes cyber
training design and organization as well as the design of
analytical visualizations for KYPO Cyber Range [7]. The
rest of this section is structured according to the proposed
scheme as follows.
The top-level categories of Visual Situational Awareness
and Visual Data Analytics in Fig. 4 represent distinct concepts
using different data in different phases of the life cycle. They
are discussed in two separate subsections. During conceptu-
alization, we observed that the analytical tasks of TRAINING
DESIGNERS represent a subset of activities associated with
the reflection phase of TRAINING ANALYSTS. Hypotheses and
visualizations of the planning phase are, therefore, covered
by the Visual Data Analytics category.
Classification at the second level defines key visualiza-
tion tasks V1–V6 that are detailed later in this section. They
differ in the roles involved in the visual analysis, analytical
goals, and other aspects. Discussion is primarily focused
on visual requirements and justification for the third-level
classification of hypotheses V1A–V6B.
Providing an exhaustive list of hypotheses for each task
V1A–V6B is impossible; they emerge continuously as users
conduct analyses and gain insights into the solved problem.
Instead, we discuss an abstraction used for the classification
and propose several hypotheses as examples.
5.1 Visual Situational Awareness
Existing theoretical concepts of situational awareness dis-
tinguish between perception, comprehension, and projection
corresponding to the three levels of the well-known Endsley
model [39]. However, the significance and meaning of the
levels can differ in the context of cybersecurity training
depending on users’ roles and their goals. This is because
providing comprehensive insight into cybersecurity events
during the execution phase can be undesirable in certain
circumstances. This aspect is reflected in our classification,
as discussed in what follows. Table 3 summarizes visualiza-
tions and hypotheses for situational awareness.
Insight of Trainees (V1) visualizations support
TRAINEES in keeping track of what is happening at the
moment and understanding the training content. The view
on the data should be strictly person-centered and adapted
to the history and performance of each particular TRAINEE
so that they can concentrate on the development during the
training session from their perspective.
The level of detail provided to TRAINEES has to be care-
fully considered when designing visualizations. A visual
storytelling approach to learning can provide comprehen-
sive guidance of TRAINEES throughout the training session.
Using event-based visualizations emphasizing important
actions and events that appeared during the execution phase
can help the TRAINEES grasp the main ideas of the training
content. However, this approach is rather exceptional, and
visual guidance is usually intentionally restricted. A typical
goal of hands-on cybersecurity training is just to exercise the
perception, comprehension, and projection skills of TRAINEES;
a subtle visual run-time support better mimics real-world
conditions. The visual-based comprehension is often left
for the personal feedback (V4) tools in the reflection phase
(discussed later in this Section).
The clustering of hypotheses revealed two fields of
TRAINEE interest. Awareness of the state of the network envi-
ronment (V1A) covers hypotheses relevant to overseeing the
state of the training network maintained by a TRAINEE. It is
used to infer knowledge of hidden cyber events and actions
6TABLE 3
Visual Situational Awareness: Visualization tasks V1 and V2 are further
divided into two (V1A–V1B), and three (V2A–V2C) categories. Each
category is accompanied by sample hypotheses formulated as
prerequisites for verification (“I suppose that . . . ”).
V1 – Insight of Trainees
Awareness of the state of network environment (V1A):
As a trainee, I suppose that . . .
. . . the web running at host X is accessible for users.
. . . the host X is accessible for me via SSH.
. . . the external network (including internet) remains accessible.
Awareness of cybersecurity posture (V1B):
As a trainee, I suppose that . . .
. . . server X I am defending is now under attack.
. . . my previous attack actions were successful.
. . . I have successfully protected server X against
the DDoS attack.
V2 – Insight of Organizing Participants
Training progression (V2A):
As a sparring partner, I suppose that . . .
. . . the trainee X completed task Y , a prerequisite for task Z.
. . . the DDoS attack against host X defended by trainee Y
was successful.
. . . trainee X fixed the vulnerability allowing a DDoS attack
at host Y .
Training management (V2B):
As a supervisor, I suppose that . . .
. . . all trainees completed task Y , a prerequisite for task Z.
. . . trainee X solved the task successfully.
. . . trainee X is in trouble (working on task longer than Y min).
Infrastructure management (V2C):
As an operator, I suppose that . . .
. . . service X at host Y is up and running.
. . . service X at host Y is inaccessible longer than Y min.
. . . network of trainee X is connected to the rest of exercise
infrastructure.
from the infrastructure data (D4). Awareness of cybersecurity
posture (V1B) is related to the understanding of cyber events
and actions defined as education goals in training definitions.
Insight of Organizing Participants (V2) visualizations
support SPARRING PARTNERS, SUPERVISORS, and OPERA-
TORS in gaining insight into the state and progress of train-
ing sessions. Views are usually shared across all participants
of the same role, providing them a view of the training
progression, score, solved tasks, and other milestones and
assessment data related to planning and timing. However,
the views have to be adapted to each organizing role. V2
is, therefore, divided into three categories of hypotheses ac-
cording to organizing roles. Training progression (V2A) is used
by SPARRING PARTNERS who need to know the current state
of the TRAINEES’ networks and services so that they can
coordinate their actions and perform them in proper order
and time. Training management (V2B) of SUPERVISORS should
be able to identify troubles of TRAINEES as soon as possible.
Infrastructure management (V2C) is intended for OPERATORS
who have to monitor the unreliable infrastructure of the
cyber range to detect technical problems.
Regardless of the specific role, the supervising activities
of all organizing participants force them to perceive the
current state of the training, to comprehend the situation, and
to project the future status so that the training progresses
smoothly and efficiently. In contrast to the Insight of Trainees
(V1), analytical visualizations of organizing participants
should fully support all these levels of awareness.
5.2 Visual Data Analytics
Our classification combines user roles of the cybersecurity
training life cycle (see Fig. 2) and data categories (Section 4).
Table 4 summarizes the classification of hypotheses that are
explained in the remainder of this section.
TABLE 4
Visual Data Analytics: Visualization tasks V3–V6 are further divided into
several categories (e.g., V4A–V4C). Each category is accompanied by
sample hypotheses formulated either as a prerequisite for verification
(“I suppose that . . . ”), or as working empirical hypothesis that is
assumed to be explaining certain fact about phenomena (“I wonder . . . ”
and “I search for . . . ”).
V3 – Personal Feedback
Personal reflection of trainees (V3A):
As a trainee, I wonder . . .
. . . what I did wrong in the task X .
. . . where I lost the most points and why.
. . . how I performed compared to other trainees.
Impact of supervision (V3B):
As a supervisor, I wonder . . .
. . . if I intervened in time.
. . . if I intervened properly.
. . . if I overlooked some troubles.
V4 – Quality of Training Exercise
Correctness of a training definition (V4A):
As a designer, I suppose that . . .
. . . all tasks are relevant to learning objectives.
. . . task X of the training definition Y is solvable.
. . . the training definition X is solvable as a whole (no logical
flaws in connections and dependencies of individual tasks).
Difficulty of a training definition (V4B):
As a designer, I suppose that . . .
. . . prerequisite skills of trainees were well-defined.
. . . the training definition X is suitable for beginners/experts/...
. . . teams of trainees were well-balanced
(there were no extreme differences in skills of each team).
Comparison of the difficulty (V4C):
As a designer, I suppose that . . .
. . . the training definition X is more difficult than definition Y .
. . . tasks in the training definition X require more time to finish
than tasks in definition Y .
. . . assessment criteria of the training definition X were
of lower quality than assessment criteria of definition Y .
V5 – Behavior Analysis
Successful strategies (V5A):
As an analyst, I suppose that . . .
. . . limiting network access is a better strategy than fixing
individual vulnerabilities in the network.
. . . dividing responsibility for defending individual
hosts between team members is more efficient than
ad-hoc defense.
Cooperation patterns (V5B):
As an analyst, I suppose that . . .
. . . closer cooperation between team members leads to more
effective protection against attacks.
. . . the team X had a strong leader who communicated with
the rest of the team significantly more often.
V6 – Infrastructure Analysis
Performance analysis (V6A):
As an operator or designer, I search for . . .
. . . the most utilized links/nodes/CPUs
in the infrastructure for training definition X .
. . . the peak memory usage of individual network
nodes in training definition X .
Reliability analysis (V6B):
As an operator or designer, I search for . . .
. . . the mean time to failure of nodes in the infrastructure.
. . . unstable custom network services in the infrastructure.
Personal Feedback (V3) to PARTICIPANTS has a signifi-
cant positive impact on the learning process [40, p. 480]. A
good post-training visual feedback should explain the pros
7and cons of the chosen approach and indicate the areas for
further improvement.
Effective person-centered feedback should occur as soon
as possible, during or right after the execution phase when
the TRAINEES remember details of their behavior, deci-
sions, and conducted actions. Deploying such immediate
visual feedback requires automated data processing and
automatically generated personalized views for individual
TRAINEES.
Our classification scheme is divided according to roles
that benefit from timely feedback: personal reflection of
trainees (V3A) and impact of supervision (V3B).
Personal feedback is crucial for the TRAINEES to learn
from the exercise as much as possible. Nowadays, the feed-
back is often restricted to providing a simple scoreboard
with very limited informal comments from SUPERVISORS
(a so-called “hot wash-up” session). There might be an
additional debriefing later when SUPERVISORS manually
process the data. However, the analysis is laborious, and the
delayed presentation of findings might reduce the impact
on TRAINEES [32]. They should receive a view of their
behavior during the training session as well as comparison
with other TRAINEES. Moreover, the data analysis should
be automated to provide in-depth feedback right after the
training session. Feedback visualizations have to be well-
designed and intuitive. Using common techniques would
be necessary because TRAINEES usually do not have time to
familiarize themselves with complex tools. A low number
of easy-to-decode charts (bar/line charts, scatter plots, etc.)
should be favored over the complex VA tools. The user
interface should motivate users to explore the data and learn
from their mistakes. Applying the methods of user-centered
design [26], [41] is, hence, a must.
SUPERVISORS can also benefit from personalized feed-
back after a training session since their interventions in-
fluence TRAINEES. The visualizations should provide an
overview as well as detailed per-trainee data. This allows
SUPERVISORS to analyze the impact of their interventions
and learn from their possible mistakes in managing the
training session.
Feedback for SPARRING PARTNERS and OPERATORS is
rare, since the main objective of the training is to teach
TRAINEES. This is why we omitted these two roles from the
classification.
Quality of Training Exercise (V4) reflects the usefulness
of training sessions for TRAINEES. The main motivation is
to improve future training programs by reviewing collected
data by DESIGNERS, i.e., experts with educational skills, who
are responsible for the training content. The quality can be
measured and compared by various qualitative attributes
that capture individual features of training sessions. Cor-
rectness, for example, can express the ability of TRAINEES
to solve required tasks considering properties of the un-
derlying infrastructure, the logical consistency of tasks, or
availability of meaningful instructions. Difficulty can be ex-
pressed as the time required to finish the training session or
minimal skills required of TRAINEES. DESIGNERS can study
either results of individual training runs of the same training
definition or compare training definitions mutually.
Our classification scheme divides V4 hypotheses ac-
cording to qualitative attributes and the multiplicity of
involved training runs: Correctness of a training definition
(V4A), difficulty of a training definition (V4B), and comparison
of the difficulty (V4C). Other qualitative attributes, apart from
correctness or difficulty, can be considered. However, not
all combinations are meaningful. For example, correctness
typically represents a binary value (correct or incorrect) and
then mutual comparison does not make sense.
The quality of a training session is primarily affected by
three mutually connected factors:
• Training content defined by technical scenario (D1).
Ambiguous or illogical tasks and their extreme dif-
ficulty or simplicity can discourage TRAINEES from
proceeding, rendering the training session useless.
• Assessment defined by assessment criteria (D2). They
affect achieving educational goals. Unbalanced as-
sessment (too lax or strict) can lead to bypassing
tasks or demotivate TRAINEES.
• Proficiency and motivation of TRAINEES. The lack
of knowledge, skills, or motivation can prevent
TRAINEES from finishing the training. Knowledge
and skills are usually measured as part of prereq-
uisite testing using questionnaires or small practical
tasks.
Visual analytics can help to balance these factors by provid-
ing different views on the triplet and enabling DESIGNERS
to study their mutual interactions and dependencies so that
the impact of training is maximized for a given group of
TRAINEES. Techniques of multiple coordinated views [42]
can be used to support this exploratory analysis effectively.
Behavior Analysis (V5) can help in discovering relevant
facts about TRAINEES, their skills, or behavioral patterns
under stress. The observations can either reveal issues or
inconsistencies in training definitions or identify general
patterns applicable in practical cyber defense. For instance,
visualization of users’ actions can reveal patterns of success-
ful cooperation or successful attack/defense strategies.
Successful strategies (V5A) and cooperation patterns (V5B)
are two primary categories of analytical hypotheses directly
related to cybersecurity education where visual perception
can significantly help. The former analyzes defense and
attack strategies, e.g., completely cutting off the defended
network on the firewall vs. selective suspension of services
being under attack. The analysis of cooperation patterns can
be considered a part of the strategy analysis. However, it
focuses more on people, their cooperation tactics, and how
they influence the results of the training. The classification
scheme can be extended to reflect other requirements of
cybersecurity experts.
The raw data D3 – D5 of training runs has usually a
form of time-stamped events. Reconstruction, visualization,
and analysis of user processes that produced the data are
possible by employ techniques of process mining [43], [44].
Analysis of behavioral aspects can also be supported by spe-
cific statistical, knowledge discovery, or machine learning
models incorporated into the VA process (see Fig. 1). For
example, methods related to the node centrality in social
networks [45] can be used to identify skilled leaders in team-
based training sessions. Anomaly detection algorithms [46]
can identify strong/weak skills of trainees, for instance.
8These data can also serve to measure learning. [47] pro-
poses several metrics for measuring performance that are
applicable in cybersecurity training. These include tracking
the time spent on tasks, observing the usage of specific
tools in logs, or automatically checking properties of the
virtual environment, such as uptime of services. A concrete
example in the context of CDXs is presented in [48]: the
evaluators measure the time of the attack, compromise,
detection, mitigation, and restoration. In [49], also non-
technical aspects are measured, such as team behavior.
Infrastructure Analysis (V6) represents another essential
activity that can affect the results and impact of cyberse-
curity training. Any technical difficulties or malfunctions
can negatively influence TRAINEES. Related visualizations
should support OPERATORS and DESIGNERS in exploring
training definitions and their requirements on the infrastruc-
ture and provide them with a “backstage” view on the
operational data captured in the execution phase.
As opposed to the infrastructure management (V2C) in
situational awareness, this category relates to the feasibility
of the underlying infrastructure to serve according to the
prescription of the training definitions. For example, if a
heavily used server is allocated on a shared virtual node in
the cyber range, then its response time can be prohibitively
slow. This can hinder TRAINEES in fulfilling the tasks.
Suitable visual tactics strongly depend on features and
possibilities that are specific for technology used to im-
plement the underlying infrastructure. Our classification,
therefore, uses qualitative aspects that delimit generic re-
quirements on the infrastructure: performance analysis (V6A)
and reliability analysis (V6B). The performance deals with the
utilization of resources at various levels of granularity (CPU,
memory, network nodes). Reliability is related to the failure
rate of individual facilities. However, these two qualities
represent only an example.
6 DEMONSTRATION
In this section, we illustrate the application of our concep-
tual model on the KYPO Cyber Range platform, which is
being developed by the cybersecurity team at our university
since 2013. From the beginning, KYPO was designed with
an emphasis on user-friendliness and support for providing
interactive visual insight into cybersecurity and learning
processes. It represents a comprehensive system suitable for
demonstrating the applicability of our model. As the KYPO
visualizations were designed on the fly without a conceptual
view towards the application domain, this section aims to
demonstrate how the model fits the existing design of a
complex cyber range and to reveal the undersupported parts
of the training life cycle. The presented visualizations only
illustrate possible approaches to the design of specific visual
analysis tools.
To the best of our knowledge, other cyber ranges and
cybersecurity training tools focus primarily on the training
content, providing only limited visual insight. Nevertheless,
we aim to discuss other approaches when the KYPO does
not provide a suitable example.
6.1 Training Life Cycles and Data in KYPO
The KYPO Cyber Range [7] is a highly flexible and scalable
cloud-based platform. Its core functionality is to emulate
computer networks with full-fledged operating systems and
network devices that mimic real-world systems. Its primary
use is hands-on cybersecurity training, especially attack-
only capture the flag games and cyber defense exercises.
It is also used in other cybersecurity applications, such as
forensic investigation. The platform provides tools for the
automated collection of various data that can be further
analyzed. These include network flows, computer logs, user
commands, and user actions from GUI (e.g., mouse clicks or
submitted forms).
The main user interface is a web application called the
KYPO portal. We gradually extend the set of available visual-
izations and visual analytics tools integrated into the KYPO
portal using the participatory design process. Nine cyberse-
curity experts (two specializing in cybersecurity education
who are co-authors of this paper) closely collaborated in
the design and evaluation of novel visualizations and the
improvement of their features.
Capture the Flag games consist of tasks divided into
consecutive levels where access to the next level is con-
ditioned by completing the previous one. Players can use
hints or skip entire levels. These actions (taking hints and
skipping or completing a level) are penalized or rewarded
by scoring points. The final scores of individual TRAINEES
within the same session are mutually comparable and can
be used for their evaluation. A typical session lasts for one
to two hours. Several SUPERVISORS facilitate a group of up
to 20 TRAINEES working as individuals or in pairs.
DESIGNERS of CTF games are experts from the cy-
bersecurity incident response team of our university or
undergraduate students of a one-semester course on de-
signing cybersecurity games [50]. They produce training
definitions that describe both technical scenarios (D1) and
assessment criteria (D2). The training definition is a set of
(plain text) documents that include: a description of the
network environment and the configuration of individual
network nodes (including vulnerabilities to be exploited in
the game levels); a common background story and task
descriptions (for each level); definition of hints, worked-
out solutions and penalty points for taking hints (for each
level); the TRAINEE’s prerequisites, educational objectives
and further assessment criteria. Designers can interactively
prepare content and allocate resources required for training
sessions through the KYPO portal.
The produced training definitions are used for creating
training sessions in the execution phase. The KYPO Cyber
Range automatically logs TRAINEES’ user actions (D3). Some
of the training definitions contain pre- and post-game ques-
tionnaires for assessing TRAINEE knowledge (i.e., assessment
data (D5)), which is stored as well. So far, infrastructure data
(D4) collection is not supported in CTF games.
Cyber Czech is a series of technical cyber defense exer-
cises for up to six blue teams (3–4 members). The TRAINEES
must protect their infrastructure against various attacks
from the red team and fulfill requests from other SPAR-
RING PARTNERS, as defined in Sec. 3.2. The exercise spans
two days. During the first day, the TRAINEES familiarize
themselves with the virtual environment. The second day is
devoted to the actual training session, which lasts 6 hours.
A brief (up to 30 minutes) personalized feedback session
follows right after the exercise. Finally, there is another
9feedback session approximately two weeks later, in which
organizers elaborate on the strengths and weaknesses of
each team. From each exercise, we collect network flows,
computer logs, user commands, and automatic and manual
scoring records.
The variability and complexity of CDXs are substantially
bigger than in CTFs. The preparation of a new training
run of Cyber Czech exercise takes tens of person-months.
A unique training definition is created almost from scratch
each year and is only repeated a few times. Only a GUI for
the execution and reflection phases are currently supported in
the KYPO Portal, both to a limited extent.
The technical scenario (D1) is comprised of the infras-
tructure of nearly 200 computer nodes in multiple local
networks, scheduled attacks and respective vulnerabilities,
and configuration of monitoring tools for both trainees
and organizers. Multiple iterations make the preparation
very laborious. Each Cyber Czech exercise series is framed
with a unique story and additional non-technical tasks. The
assessment criteria (D2) include several dozen automatically
scored network services (e.g., availability of web server
or database) and up to 30 manually scored tasks (e.g.,
penalties for individual attacks, communication with the
SPARRING PARTNERS from the white team or fictitious users),
and requests for reverting malfunctioned network nodes.
Complex dependencies in which one network service (e.g.,
active directory) depends on other services (such as DNS)
often exist. All this complicates the design and implementa-
tion of a unified data scheme and corresponding front-end
tools. Correctness and the estimation of difficulty of training
definitions are addressed by so-called “dry runs” in which
the whole exercise is tested by volunteers. However, the
approach is costly and can be misleading because the readi-
ness of testers may significantly differ from the readiness of
target learners.
6.2 Visual Analytics of Capture the Flag Games
Insight of Trainees (V1). TRAINEES gain insight into the
game content through the web-based KYPO portal, which
provides them with task descriptions, hints, and solutions
for each level and also shows information about the current
level and remaining time of the training session. The Net-
work Topology visualization (Fig. 5) mediates remote access
to individual hosts via a web browser and provides situ-
ational awareness by decorating a simple network graph
with various semantic symbols. For example, it is possi-
ble to support V1A by coloring network links depending
on current throughput, and V1B by glyphs distinguishing
logical roles of hosts (attacker, victim), or events captured in
hosts (e.g., received mails). The importance and quantity of
this semantic data differ between training definitions, and
they also vary in time. Combining them meaningfully and
showing them at the right time so that the TRAINEES are not
overburdened is a challenging task.
Insight of Organizing Participants (V2). Since we cur-
rently support attack-only CTFs without SPARRING PART-
NERS, no special visualizations for V2A exist in KYPO.
1. We provide a full-page version of the visualization in
Supplementary Materials at https://www.kypo.cz/media/3197111/
tvcg19-supplemental-materials.pdf
Fig. 5. Network Topology with glyphs supporting situational awareness.1
SUPERVISORS use CTF Training Session Overview visu-
alization (Fig. 6) that displays the progress of TRAINEES
throughout the CTF game. Each row captures the training
session of individual TRAINEES, who can start at slightly
different times. Colored bars represent levels. Dots represent
user events (e.g., taking a hint), vertical lines show ex-
pected level duration. SUPERVISORS use this view to actively
manage the training session (V2B) by looking for TRAINEES
in trouble (e.g., those stuck in a level for too long, those
repeatedly trying to guess the flag to pass the level instead
of solving the task, or those about to quit without trying,
which is signaled by displaying all the hints and the solution
shortly after each other).
Fig. 6. CTF Training Session Overview shows the progress of individual
trainees during the training session.1
Since our CTFs are executed in the complex cloud-based
KYPO Cyber Range, dealing with technical issues is dele-
gated to specialized operators managing this infrastructure.
They gain insight into the infrastructure state (V2C) via off-
the-shelf OpenNebula Sunstone dashboard (see supplemen-
tal materials1).
Personal Feedback (V3). At the end of a session,
TRAINEES receive a CTF Feedback Dashboard [51] supporting
V3A with two complementary views (Fig. 7). The left view
provides the final score overview for comparison with other
TRAINEES. The lengths of the bars show the time of the
slowest trainee; different color intensity provides informa-
tion about the average time. The right side of the dashboard
displays the individual score development in time through-
out the game. The width of striped areas represents time
spent in levels. Dots represent user events. A very similar
dashboard is used by SUPERVISORS (V3B) who, in addition,
can plot multiple TRAINEES into the score development time
series chart for comparison.
Quality of Training Exercise (V4). Qualitative aspects
of CTF training definitions are supported in KYPO by simple
statistical visualizations, e.g., histograms and boxplots cap-
turing the distribution of scores gained by TRAINEES. The
CTF Feedback Dashboard (Fig. 7) from personal feedback (V3)
can be also used to identify weak parts of the training, e.g.
levels where TRAINEES spend a long time. However, deeper
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Fig. 7. CTF Feedback Dashboard providing individual view on TRAINEE’s score results and development in time.1
research and the design of narrowly focused visualizations
for quality-related analysis is a future work opportunity.
Behavior Analysis (V5). Behavior in connection with
cybersecurity is often linked to attack graphs and estimation
of weak points in the network. A study [52] introduced
a method for analyzing computer network security. The
method operates with attack paths that represent a link-
age of individual nodes with conditions of compromised
network security. The output is an attack graph with be-
havior prediction, and the authors propose the use of their
method for incident response training. As for CTF games,
the method could also bring insight to the trainee’s actions
and help the instructor to monitor progress or strategies.
Infrastructure Analysis (V6). The already mentioned off-
the-shelf dashboard provided by OpenNebula Sunstone is
currently used also for the basic qualitative evaluation of the
underlying cloud infrastructure of the KYPO Cyber Range.
However, its utilization for these tasks is not very effective,
as it is a universal cloud management tool.
6.3 Visual Analytics of Cyber Czech
Insight of Trainees (V1). Since Cyber Czech is mainly a tech-
nical exercise, awareness of the network state V1A and cyber-
security posture V1B are intentionally restricted to resemble
real-world settings, as discussed in Section 5. TRAINEES
interact with a network topology visualization similar to
Fig. 5. However, the network infrastructure is more com-
plex, and there are no semantic decorations. Instead, the
TRAINEES use a standard monitoring tool (Nagios) showing
the status of the network services they are trying to protect.
Further, they can infer the consequences of their actions
only from the real-time CDX Scoreboard (Fig. 8) displayed
during the exercise. The scoreboard shows the current total
score as well as per-category scores and penalties of all blue
teams, allowing them to compare themselves. The use of
a restricted table-based view is intentional, as we aim to
simulate real conditions during the CDX with only limited
real-time feedback.
Insight of Organizing Participants (V2). Training pro-
gression (V2A) of the red team is supported by CDX Attack
Plan (Fig. 9) showing the interactive plan of individual
Fig. 8. CDX Scoreboard shows the current scores of all blue teams.1
attacks and their state (inactive/ongoing/completed). The
green color stands for successful attacks; red stands for un-
successful ones (i.e., the blue team has defended themselves).
Attack type abbreviations and given penalty points are
shown within each block. Clicking on an attack block reveals
further details (e.g., additional comments or screenshots).
The green team uses the Nagios service monitoring system to
watch the infrastructure (V2C), to detect when the trainees
(un)intentionally blocked some of the monitored and scored
services, and to provide brief advice (V2B). Visual insight of
other organizing participants is not currently supported.
Fig. 9. CDX Attack Plan displays scheduled attacks of the red team at
the end of a 6-hour long training session.1
Personal Feedback (V3). During the hot-washup session,
organizers give immediate verbal feedback to TRAINEES.
Personal reflections on the trainees (V3A) are supported by
presenting them the CDX Attack Plan (Fig. 9) that was
hidden from the TRAINEES during the exercise. TRAINEES
are also provided with the CDX Personalized Feedback [53]
(Fig. 10) that shows the score development of their blue
team. Dots include details about penalties entered by red,
white, and green teams. Each dot is associated with a short
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feedback poll used for gathering further information from
TRAINEES. The data is used in the follow-up analysis. The
impact of supervision V3B is not currently supported.
Fig. 10. CDX Personalized Feedback shows the score development
throughout the training session of a single blue team.1
Quality of Training Exercise (V4). Vorobkalov and Ka-
maev [54] describe an approach to the quality estimation of
e-learning systems. Their learning process model is based
on an extended stochastic Petri net. The method has been
implemented in an automated system, and it focuses on
helping the expert to perform e-learning process analysis
and to deduce learning course mistakes. However, it covers
only systems based on net models. For CDX training, the
model would not reflect the closely related state of the
operational environment. Furthermore, when we consider
the unstructured nature of CDX, the model would have to
be very sophisticated and extensive.
Behavior Analysis (V5). The above-mentioned method
by Bassett and Gabriel [52] can also be applied to the CDX
use case. In this embodiment, the method could be utilized
in the form of an attack tool to execute or simulate the
events and conditions in the attack graph. The trainee would
then receive the output, helping them identify attacks they
were facing and allowing them to learn from the events
retrospectively (since in CDX, we don’t usually want to give
them any instant feedback). However, such output would
have to be further transformed into a visual form suitable
for this type of training.
Infrastructure Analysis (V6). The support for this type
of visual analysis is essentially non-existent at the moment.
Although the KYPO platform collects some types of relevant
data (e.g., system logs and commands entered by blue teams
at individual network nodes), the data is processed ad-
hoc and manually or not at all. This is usually done for a
debriefing meeting of the organizing participants about a
week after the training session. The attendees summarize
their observations backed by collected data (e.g., feedback
forms from the TRAINEES, analysis of the score develop-
ment). To support the discussion, we are developing an
analytical tool for CDX evaluation that will provide a time-
line visualization of automatic and manual logs together
with the communication threads among the blue team and
corresponding white team members (Fig. 11).
7 DISCUSSION
In this section, we emphasize four key observations we
attained and present the challenges for future visualization
research in the domain.
The current visualization tools support only situational aware-
ness during the execution phase. The main focus of training
sessions is on the execution phase. Therefore, visualizations
are designed to provide insight both to trainees (V1) and
organizing participants (V2). The reflection phase, in con-
trast, is vastly unsupported, with the exception of personal
feedback (V3) for trainees.
Organizers have limited insight into the educational impact
on learners. The design of cybersecurity training sessions is
driven mainly by technical aspects. Training sessions often
aim at mastering a particular cybersecurity technique or
procedure without focusing on broader learning goals. To
overcome this issue, the top-down approach of designing
the training must be applied, starting from defining learning
goals and going down to a selection of particular techniques.
Visual measuring and comparing the quality of learned
skills, which is largely overlooked, could help in this pro-
cess. There is a broad unexplored research area in training
quality (V4) and behavior (V5) analysis.
Organizers underestimate infrastructure monitoring and
analysis. CTF and CDX depend heavily on customized
monitoring and management tools for the underlying in-
frastructure (V2C). However, these tools are lacking. Low-
level monitoring tools and other general-purpose solutions,
which do not provide a complex overview of the situation,
are preferred to customized ones. Analytical tools for post-
event infrastructure analysis (V6) are also lacking.
Data collection is not a problem; data processing is. It is possi-
ble to collect large amounts of multivariate data either from
the emulated network environment (e.g., network flows,
computer logs, commands entered) or from the user inter-
faces of the cyber range (e.g., mouse tracking, and clicks).
The bottleneck lies in data processing and presentation, as
we point out in the demonstrative examples. Especially in
CDX, data correlation is a difficult task. With rising interest
in the quality of training exercise (V4), a behavior analysis
(V5) could accelerate the demands on the use of the data.
Fig. 11. Prototype of CDX Analytical Dashboard.1
Challenges for the visualization community are a re-
flection of the absence of tools. Table 5 summarizes users
who benefit from the six visualization tasks, as revealed by
the conceptual model in Section 5. Each bullet represents
a visually-analytical use case. However, only a few use
cases are somehow covered in current practice. For the post-
exercise analysis, the main challenge is to find meaningful
uses of the collected data to improve the SUPERVISORS’
understanding of TRAINEES skill development as well as to
provide insight into the training processes for DESIGNERS.
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TABLE 5
The mapping of the low-level roles on the visualization tasks.
trainee sparringpartner supervisor designer operator
V1 •
V2 • • •
V3 • •
V4 •
V5 • • • • •
V6 • •
Another challenge is to design and develop VA tools to help
the DESIGNERS and ORGANIZERS test their hypotheses. Last
but not least, it is necessary to revisit the tools for situational
awareness of participants during the exercise and provide
them with timely individual feedback.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Hands-on cybersecurity training is crucial in educating the
future workforce. However, measuring the effectiveness of
the training process, using either technical or educational
indicators, remains largely unexplored. Our work is mo-
tivated by a desire to improve these aspects by applying
visual analytics. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is
the first attempt to describe the application of VA models to
hands-on cybersecurity education.
We used software engineering methods to describe the
training life cycle and formalize user roles involved in cy-
bersecurity training sessions. The foundations of our work
lie in the existing generic VA models. We systematized
the visualizations and hypotheses into six categories and
demonstrated the application of the VA model on two
classes of cybersecurity training hosted at the KYPO Cyber
Range platform. The main limitation is the lack of details
from other cyber ranges and training sessions. However, we
assume that they are on a similar level of maturity. We back
this claim with the experience of our university cybersecu-
rity team members from their participation in events similar
to the Cyber Czech exercise series.
Each of the six visualization tasks of the presented con-
ceptual model deserves further investigation. The definition
of specific guidelines that can help VA designers and re-
searchers build visual tools is out of the scope of this paper.
However, this paper aims to serve as a framework for such
guidelines, providing researchers relevant use cases where
the application of VA is demanding. We hope that our work
will help to establish the agenda for advancing the state of
the art and motivate other visualization researchers to ex-
plore the domain in which tehe research areas of education,
cybersecurity, and data visualization intersect.
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